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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
European Communities*
I. Constitutional and Institutional Matters
The 1986 agreement of all Member States of the European Communities
to amend and update the Basic Community Treaties, known as the Single
European Act,1 has now been implemented in the law of the U.K. by the
(U.K.) European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986. The Republic of
Ireland also approved the Single European Act by public referendum, as
required under the Irish Constitution. The Member States are expected
to complete the depositing of their instruments of ratification of the agree-
ment in the near future, bringing the Single European Act uniformly into
force in those States one month later. 2
II. Competition (Antitrust) Law
A. AIR TRANSPORT AND COMPETITION
The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
(ECJ) in Ministere Public v. Lucas Asjes3 held that, in the absence of any
implementing regulation conferring specific powers of enforcement upon
the European Communities (EC) Commission in relation to violations in
the air transport sector, the Commission was entitled to proceed against
violations (i.e., of articles 85 and 86, EEC) under its general powers
conferred by article 89, EEC. As a result of that judgment, the Commis-
sion commenced formal proceedings against ten Community "national"
*Prepared by David L. Perrott, Dean of the Faculty of Law, and Reader in Business Law
in the Center for European Legal Studies, University of Exeter, U.K.
1. Single European Act (SEA), BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Supp. 2/86, U.K. Command
Paper Cmd. No. 9758. For a description of the contents of the SEA, see 21 INT'L LAW.
571, 571-74 (1987).
2. Art. 33(2), SEA.
3. Cases 209-213/84, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173 (1986). For a discussion of that case and
its background, see 21 INT'L LAW. 571, 576 (1987).
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airlines 4 under that article. There being no precedents for a pure "general
powers" procedure under article 89, the Commission initially wrote (in
July 1986) to the airlines, setting out its evidence of their violations of
article 85, EEC. The Commission focused in particular on price-fixing
arrangements. It called attention to the Lucas Asjes judgment and the
subsequent decision in principle of the EC Council to implement the
competition rules of the EEC Treaty in the air transport sector, and
required the airlines to submit within two months comments and proposals
for bringing their infringing restrictions on competition to an end. 5 At the
end of the two months two airlines had still not replied, but some had
sought to open immediate negotiations with the Commission to legalize
their position, and some had sought a further two months' extension,
which was granted. 6 By March 18, 1987, the Commission considered that
three airlines, Alitalia, Lufthansa, and Olympic Airways, had not under-
taken to abandon their violations, as the remaining seven had. It therefore
adopted formal reasoned decisions against them under article 89(2), EEC,
rendering any relevant agreements between them a nullity7 and requiring
them to terminate their violations under threat of penalties. 8 These air-
lines, however, were permitted a further three weeks for reflection before
the decisions took effect. By early April 1987 the three airlines capitulated,
undertaking to abandon their most serious violations at once, and to enter
discussions with the Commission on the phased elimination of the re-
mainder.9 These are specifically "to limit and circumscribe the extent of
revenue pooling, to eliminate all capacity sharing provisions and to permit
flexible responses to passenger demand and to abandon agreements on
fare types and levels."' 10
It should be observed that whereas the Commission chose to proceed
initially only against "national" airlines of Member States, the legal prin-
4. I.e., Sabena (Belgium), SAS (Denmark), Lufthansa (Germany), Olympic Airways
(Greece), Air France (France), Aer Lingus (Ireland), Alitalia (Italy), KLM (Netherlands),
British Airways (U.K.) and British Caldedonian (U.K.).
5. IP Press Release 353 (1986).
6. IP Press Release 425 (1986).
7. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85(2),
298 U.N.T.S. II, 48 [hereinafter EEC]. Notwithstanding that violative agreements were
always (i.e., since 1958) in principle prohibited by art. 85(l), EEC, and therefore apparently
null under art. 85(2), the ECJ decided in Lucas Asjes, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173 (1986), that,
in the absence of an implementing regulation applicable to air transport, such agreements
could benefit from the Community Law doctrine of "provisional validity" as regards their
enforceability in a national court, i.e., unless and until pronounced against by a formal
decision of the Commission such as was taken here.
8. IP Press Release 115 (1987).
9. IP Press Release 151 (1987).
10. Id.
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ciples involved can equally be invoked against any airline or other un-
dertakings involved in air transport, wherever based, whose anti-
competitive arrangements or practices are capable of affecting trade (in
goods or services) between the Member States and which can be subjected
to Community personal jurisdiction, to which, of course, airlines are in-
herently vulnerable. For airlines generally, the thirty-year honeymoon
provided by the absence of an implementing regulation is finally over.
B. MARITIME TRANSPORT AND COMPETITION
Until now, maritime transport shared with air transport the peculiarity
that, while in principle subject to Community competition law, especially
articles 85 and 86, EEC, there was no regulation implementing those
articles by giving detailed enforcement powers to the Commission. This
situation arose from the same legislative history as still affects air trans-
port. The basic general implementing regulation, Regulation 17/62,11 was
removed from effect on the transport sector by Regulation 141/62.12 Spe-
cific implementation for road, rail, and inland waterway transport was
provided by Regulation 1017/68,13 but this left air and sea transport un-
provided for.
The United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Con-
ferences 1974 (Geneva) 14 caused the enactment by the Community of
Regulation 954/79,15 which provides, in relation to ratifications of, or
accessions to, that Convention by Community Member States, that these
must be done in certain ways designed to secure: (a) some competition
in intra-Community maritime trade between Community-based liens; and
(b) a reasonable share of Community maritime trade to lines based in
developing countries. In 1981 the Commission issued a Notice 16 on the
Application of article 86,17 EEC, to the Shipping Sector, 18 in which it
undertook, in reaching any article 86 decisions, to take account of the
peculiar features of this sector. The Commission agreed, in particular, to
consider the U.N. Convention and the legitimate aspirations of developing
countries. In fact, the Community has shown little or no interest in en-
forcing its competition rules on the shipping sector until this year, no
doubt because of the political sensitivities involved. As with air transport,
II. [1962] O.J. 13/204.
12. [1962] O.J. 124/2751.
13. [1968] O.J.L. 175/1.
14. 13 I.L.M. 912 (1974). This entered into force on October 6, 1983.
15. [1979] O.J.L. 121/I, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 121) 1 (1979).
16. I.e., an administrative statement of policy, rather than legislation.
17. Art. 86 of the EEC prohibits abuses of a dominant position.
18. [1981] O.J.C. 339/4(ii), 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 339) 4 (1981).
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however, the honeymoon is now officially ended; but it has been ended
by the EC Council's enactment of a package of regulations' 9 designed to
take account of shipping's "peculiar features," and not by an article 89,
EEC, procedure.
The principal statute is Regulation 4056/86,20 on the application of ar-
ticles 85 and 86, EEC, to maritime transport. Many of the procedural and
penal provisions are the same as, or analogous to, those in Regulation
17/62, notably the possibility for a substantive violation of a fine reaching
ten (10%) percent of the violator's (worldwide) turnover for the preceding
year. A special "passive exemption" procedure exists, however, under
article 85(3), EEC, in addition to the usual one, whereby applicants for
exemption are to be deemed retrospectively exempt ninety days after
publication of the application in the Official Journal, for a period of six
years, unless the Commission has objected beforehand (article 12). In
addition, special exemptions exist for "technical" (i.e., standardization
and efficient utilization) agreements (article 2). Exemptions also are avail-
able for liner conference agreements and conference-transport users
agreements that have the specified objectives of maintaining liner routes,
and that meet certain specified conditions (articles 3-7). Nevertheless,
nothing exempts from the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position in
article 86, EEC (article 8). All maritime transport to or from a community
port is covered, except "tramp vessel services" (article 1). Presumably
these are excluded on the theory that tramp contracts, being inherently
ad hoc, are unlikely to restrain competition. Nevertheless, a secret cartel
of tramp-ship owners could fix minimum tramp rates. Such action would
therefore have to be dealt with by the Commission, as with air transport,
under its general article 89, EEC, powers. When application of the Reg-
ulation is liable to produce conflict with the law or administration of a
non-Member State (e.g., the U.S.A.), the Commission must at once con-
sult with that State to attempt reconciliation of interests if possible. The
Commission is empowered to negotiate any necessary agreements with
such States (article 9).
Regulation 4056/86 is supplemented by Regulation 4057/86 on Unfair
Pricing Practices in Maritime Transport. 21 The latter regulation is a kind
of anti-maritime-dumping measure that creates a complaints investigation
procedure leading to the imposition of a "redressive duty" (article 2) on
"third country shipowners" engaged in "unfair pricing practices" with
cargo liners that injure Community interests (article 1). The duty is col-
lected on Community imports carried by such shipowners. Regulation
19. Regulations 4055-4058/86.
20. [1986] O.J.L. 378/4.
21. [1986] O.J.L. 378/14.
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4058/86 on Co-Ordinated Action to Safeguard Free Access to Cargoes in
Ocean Trades 22 has a similar protective intent. It creates a complaints
procedure leading to "co-ordinated action" by the Community where
"action by a third country of its agents" restricts access to the maritime
trade of that country to its own, or a favored foreign, merchant fleet,
injuring Community interests, other than as permitted by (a strict inter-
pretation'of) the U.N. Convention (articles 1 and 3). Coordinated action
may consist of diplomatic representations, and the imposition of permit
requirements, quotas, or duties on the fleets benefited (article 4). This
protection may be extended to non-Community OECD States (article 8).
The three above-mentioned regulations come into force on July 1, 1987.
Finally, Regulation 4055/86, on Freedom to Provide Services to Mari-
time Transport 23 puts the Community's own house in order by making it
clear that the "freedom to provide service" provisions of the EEC Treaty,
articles 55-62, apply to maritime services (article 1(3)). No Member States
discrimination is allowed between nationals of other Member States, even
those established outside the Community when their vessels are registered
in their Member States (articles 1(1) and (2)). The protection may be
extended to third country nationals established in a Member State (article
7). Existing arrangements contrary to these principles must be phased out
or adjusted (articles 3 and 4). This regulation came into force on January 1,
1987.
C. FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS
Basing itself upon the ECJ's judgment in the Pronuptia Case,24 the EC
Commission has taken its first two decisions involving franchise agree-
ments, namely Pronuptia25 (retailing of wedding clothes) and Yves Rocher26
(retailing of cosmetics). In both, the parties had notified their standard
form of agreement, and in both, the Commission granted an individual
article 85(3), EEC, exemption after certain amendments had been made.
The franchisee's exclusive rights, within its defined territory, to use of
the franchisor's knowhow, trademarks, logos and symbols, and registered
designs and models were approved. Also approved were the franchisor's
rights to monitor and control the trading methods and products sold at
the franchised premises, and to restrain the franchisee from opening a
competing business with territorial limits during the agreement and for
22. [1986] O.J.L. 378/21.
23. [1986] O.J.L. 378/I.
24. Pronuptia de Paris v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, Case 161/84, I Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 414 (1986), discussed in 21 INT'L LAW. 895-96 (1987).
25. [1987] O.J.L. 13/39, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 39 (1987).
26. [1987] O.J.L. 8/49, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) 39 (1987).
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one year thereafter. The franchise could advise on, but not determine,
the franchisee's prices to its customers. These decisions are seen as a
significant step in liberating franchises from the fear of committing com-
petition law violations.
D. KNOWHOW LICENSE AGREEMENTS
The Commission has announced 27 that it intends to enact a regulation
for a "block exemption" under article 85(3), EEC, for knowhow license
agreements, analogous to that for patent license agreements, 28 in the
Spring of 1988.
E. INSURANCE AGREEMENTS
The case of Verband de Sachversicherer v. EC Commission is dealt
with below.
III. Internal Common Market Harmonization
A. INSURANCE
The ECJ has recently given a series ofjudgments asserting the freedom,
under the EEC Treaty provisions, 29 of insurers legally established in a
Member State to provide insurance services in other Member States on
a basis of nondiscriminatory equality with those established in those other
States. This freedom overrides any national laws of those other States to
the contrary effect. Thus in EC Commission v. Germany30 the Court held
that requirements of the German National Insurance Supervision Law
(VAG), 31 allegedly for the protection of the insureds, to the effect that (a)
an insurer offering insurance services in Germany, and (b) a lead co-insurer
of risks in Germany, must have a business establishment there, were
contrary to Community Law if they were established in another Member
State. The second point, on co-insurance, was reaffirmed in EC Com-
mission v. France32 and EC Commission v. Ireland33 in respect of the
national laws of those defendant States. In a different case, EC Commis-
27. The Times, June 2, 1987.
28. Regulation 2349/84, [1984] O.J.L. 219/15, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15 (1984).
A draft text of such a regulation on knowhow licenses was published as Commission Working
Paper COM/86/EM-1.
29. Especially articles 59 and 60, supra 7, at 40-41.
30. Case 205/84, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 69 (1987).
31. Versicherungsaufsichstsgesetz.
32. Case 220/83, 2 Comm. Mkt L.R. 113 (1987).
33. Case 206/84, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 150 (1987).
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sion v. France,34 provisions of French tax law permitting the temporary
granting of tax credits only to insurance companies established or incor-
porated in France was also found contrary to Community Law, in spite
of vigorous arguments by the French that this was necessary to discourage
tax frauds by insurers. Finally, in Verband der Sachversicherer v. EC
Commission35 the Court upheld the Commission's contentions that (a)
Community competition law, in casu article 85, EEC, applied directly to
insurance undertakings, and (b) that mere recommendations, by the ap-
plicant association (of German insurers of fire risks to industrial property)
to its members, as to the premium rates they should charge, were vio-
lations of article 85.
B. COMMERCIAL AGENTS
The EC council has enacted Directive 86/653 on Self-Employed Com-
mercial Agents. 36 This requires all Member States to harmonize their
national laws on such agency contracts to comply with the model specified
in the directive, which is overtly designed to protect agents' interests
against those of the principal. States must comply by January 1, 1990, or,
in the case of Ireland and the U.K., by January 1, 1994. Ireland and the
U.K. have resisted the adoption of such legislation for many years, on
the economic grounds that it is an unwarranted interference with freedom
of contract in an area where market forces should determine relationships,
and on the legal grounds that the Common Law of Agency is totally
unsuited to this kind of regulative intervention, which is based on con-
tinental European legal concepts of agency relationships.
IV. Community Commercial Policy and External Relations
A. ILLICIT COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
In the case In re Du Pont and AKZO37 in which AKZO complained of
United States action under § 337, U.S. Tariff Act, 1930, instigated by
Du Pont, as an illicit commercial practice within the meaning of EEC
Regulation 2641/84,38 the Commission has upheld AKZO's complaint in
34. Case 270/83, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 401 (1987).
35. Case 45/85, The Times, February 7, 1987.
36. [1986] O.J.L. 382/17.
37. In re E.I. De Pont de Nemours and AKZO, [1986] O.J.C. 25/2, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 25) 2 (1986), I Comm. Mkt. L.R. 410 (1986), discussed in 21 INT'L LAW. 899-900
(1987).
38. [1984] O.J.L. 252/1, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 1 (1984).
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